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Dezember Veronica Alvarez liegt seit über 27 Stunden in den Wehen, doch das Baby will einfach nicht kommen. Nach der Geburt scheint Sebastian zunächst wie ein ganz normaler kleiner Junge aufzuwachsen. Doch seltsamer Weise häufen sich. dogcode.eu - Kaufen Sie Evil Born günstig ein. Qualifizierte Bestellungen werden kostenlos geliefert. Sie finden Rezensionen und Details zu einer vielseitigen. Evil Born [dt./OV]. (10)1 Std. 20 Min Dezember Veronica Alvarez (Sara Malakul Lane) liegt seit über 27 Stunden in den Wehen, doch das. Evil Born. Horror | USA | 86 (= BD: 90) Minuten. Regie: Jared Cohn. Kommentieren. Teilen. Im Umfeld der mysteriösen Geburt eines Säuglings am. Komplette Handlung und Informationen zu Evil Born. Dezember Veronica Alvarez (Sara Malakul Lane) liegt seit über 27 Stunden in. es ist, Veronica und Ihr Mann Carlos müssen alsbald erkennen, das ihr kleiner Sohn die Ausgeburt der Hölle ist. (Originaltitel - Evil Born) Great Movies. Evil Born [Blu-Ray]. Jared Cohn. Film (Blu-ray). Zustand: Gebraucht - Sehr gut. sofort lieferbar. % SALE %. Neu 14,99 € Sie sparen 8,89 € (59 %). Preis 6,10 €.
Universalists consider evil independent of culture, and wholly related to acts or intents. Thus, while the ideological leaders of Nazism and the Hutu Interhamwe accepted and considered it moral to commit genocide, the belief in genocide as fundamentally or universally evil holds that those who instigated this genocide are actually evil.
Hitler considered it a moral duty to destroy Jews because he saw them as the root of all of Germany's ills and the violence associated with communism.
He therefore considered non-Muslims and Shiite Muslims evil people intent on destroying Islamic purity and therefore heretic. Views on the nature of evil belong to the branch of philosophy known as ethics —which in modern philosophy is subsumed into three major areas of study: [7].
One school of thought that holds that no person is evil and that only acts may be properly considered evil.
Psychologist and mediator Marshall Rosenberg claims that the root of violence is the very concept of evil or badness. When we label someone as bad or evil, Rosenberg claims, it invokes the desire to punish or inflict pain.
It also makes it easy for us to turn off our feelings towards the person we are harming. He cites the use of language in Nazi Germany as being a key to how the German people were able to do things to other human beings that they normally would not do.
He links the concept of evil to our judicial system, which seeks to create justice via punishment— punitive justice —punishing acts that are seen as bad or wrong.
In such cultures [ citation needed ] when someone harms another person, they are believed to be out of harmony with themselves and their community, are seen as sick or ill and measures are taken to restore them to a sense of harmonious relations with themselves and others.
He says the root of anger, and the desire to harm someone, is almost always related to variations of implicit or explicit philosophical beliefs about other human beings.
He further claims that without holding variants of those covert or overt belief and assumptions, the tendency to resort to violence in most cases is less likely.
American psychiatrist M. Scott Peck on the other hand, describes evil as militant ignorance. Peck argues that while most people are conscious of this at least on some level, those that are evil actively and militantly refuse this consciousness.
Peck describes evil as a malignant type of self-righteousness which results in a projection of evil onto selected specific innocent victims often children or other people in relatively powerless positions.
Peck considers those he calls evil to be attempting to escape and hide from their own conscience through self-deception and views this as being quite distinct from the apparent absence of conscience evident in sociopaths.
According to Peck, an evil person: [40] [41]. He also considers certain institutions may be evil, as his discussion of the My Lai Massacre and its attempted coverup illustrate.
By this definition, acts of criminal and state terrorism would also be considered evil. Martin Luther argued that there are cases where a little evil is a positive good.
He wrote, "Seek out the society of your boon companions, drink, play, talk bawdy, and amuse yourself. One must sometimes commit a sin out of hate and contempt for the Devil , so as not to give him the chance to make one scrupulous over mere nothings The international relations theories of realism and neorealism , sometimes called realpolitik advise politicians to explicitly ban absolute moral and ethical considerations from international politics, and to focus on self-interest, political survival, and power politics, which they hold to be more accurate in explaining a world they view as explicitly amoral and dangerous.
Political realists usually justify their perspectives by stating that morals and politics should be separated as two unrelated things, as exerting authority often involves doing something not moral.
Machiavelli wrote: "there will be traits considered good that, if followed, will lead to ruin, while other traits, considered vices which if practiced achieve security and well being for the prince.
Anton LaVey , founder of the Church of Satan , was a materialist and claimed that evil is actually good. He was responding to the common practice of describing sexuality or disbelief as evil, and his claim was that when the word evil is used to describe the natural pleasures and instincts of men and women or the skepticism of an inquiring mind, the things called and feared as evil are really non-evil and in fact good.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The opposite or absence of good. For other uses, see Evil disambiguation. See also: Devil in Christianity.
See also: Islamic views on sin. See also: Satan in Judaism. Main article: Buddhist ethics. Main article: Ethics.
Main article: Necessary evil. Philosophy portal. God, Power, and Evil: a Process Theodicy. Oxford University Press.
Overcoming evil: genocide, violent conflict, and terrorism. New York: Oxford University Press, p. Iconographic Exegesis and Third Isaiah.
Heidelberg, Germany: Mohr Siebeck Verlag. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Chan The Philosopher. Archived from the original on Translated by Bodde, Derk.
Translated by White, W. New York: Penguin Classics. Some answered questions. Translated by Barney, Laura Clifford Repr. Koslowski The Question of Evil in Ancient Egypt.
London: Golden House Publications. Griffiths, eds. Acta Theologica. Sri guru-granth sahib [english version]. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co.
Social Science Research Network. Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore. International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling. Global Dialogue.
Retrieved August 27, Greenwood Publishing Group. Hewlett, Robert John Russell The evolution of evil. Retrieved People of the Lie: The hope for healing human evil.
Century Hutchinson. Good and evil. Animal ethics Bioethics Business ethics Discourse ethics Engineering ethics Environmental ethics Legal ethics Machine ethics Media ethics Medical ethics Nursing ethics Professional ethics Sexual ethics Ethics of artificial intelligence Ethics of eating meat Ethics of technology Ethics of terraforming Ethics of uncertain sentience.
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Mackie G. See also Apologetics Soteriology Demonology. Namespaces Article Talk. Views Read View source View history. Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file.
Download as PDF Printable version. Wikimedia Commons Wikiquote. Look up evil in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. Wikiquote has quotations related to: Evil.
Not to mention, a lot of parts could have sure used some music which was also bad by the way but not as bad as everything else to at least add some layers to the bad acting and somehow hide it a little bit.
Last but not least, the production design was also terrible. The set dressing was bare and looked completely unrealistic, the BABY was very obviously a doll especially when the guy practically tossed the baby to that woman in the beginning after figuring out it wasn't his devil spawn , the blood was completely fake-looking, and what the hell was up with her belly in the beginning?
That looked like a papier mache project gone wrong. The only redeeming thing in this film was perhaps the makeup because it was actually semi- realistic looking kind of.
Literally everything else was T. Maybe I'll finish the rest of it tomorrow just for the hell of it but damn, that was one mediocre piece of amateur trash.
I've worked on some amateur films before, and this film made all of those look like they could be nominated for Academy Awards.
I honestly don't even know why I gave it two stars instead of one. I guess the extra star is because at least they made something?
All in all though, it seems like a bunch of inexperienced and untrained perhaps untalented people got together, made a film, and while all of the components were there, they didn't fit together Looking for some great streaming picks?
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Impurity is worse than frailty because an impure person has allowed an incentive other than the moral law to guide her actions while the frail person tries, but fails, to do the right thing for the right reason Kant , Bk I, 25— The final stage of corruption is perversity, or wickedness.
Someone with a perverse will inverts the proper order of the incentives. Instead of prioritizing the moral law over all other incentives, she prioritizes self-love over the moral law.
Thus, her actions conform to the moral law only if they are in her self-interest. Someone with a perverse will need not do anything wrong because actions which best promote her self-interest may conform to the moral law.
But since the reason she performs morally right actions is self-love and not because these actions are morally right, her actions have no moral worth and, according to Kant, her will manifests the worst form of evil possible for a human being.
Kant considers someone with a perverse will an evil person Kant , Bk I, Whether, and to what extent, a person, or her will, is evil seems to depend on details about her motives and the harms she brings about and not just on whether she prioritizes self-interest over the moral law.
For instance, it seems far worse to torture someone for sadistic pleasure than to tell the truth to gain a good reputation. In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that the first act sadistic torture indicates an evil will while the second act telling the truth for self-interest indicates a will that is merely lacking in moral goodness.
But for Kant, both acts indicate wills that are equally evil for attempts to address this criticism see Garcia , Goldberg , and Timmons Kant makes several other controversial claims about the nature of evil in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.
One of these claims is that there is a radical evil in human nature. By this he means that all human beings have a propensity to subordinate the moral law to self-interest and that this propensity is radical, or rooted, in human nature in the sense that it is inextirpable.
Kant also believes that we are imputable for this propensity to evil Kant , Bk I. Richard Bernstein argues that Kant cannot coherently hold both of these theses since we could not be responsible for a propensity that is in us originally and that we cannot be rid of Bernstein , 11— See also, Bernstein and Goldberg In his Confessions , Saint Augustine tells us that one day he stole some pears for the sole sake of doing something wrong Augustine, Confessions , II, v-x.
Kant rejects the idea that human beings can be motivated in this way Kant , Bk I, sect. For Kant, human beings always have either the moral law or self-love as their incentive for acting.
Only a devil could do what is wrong just because it is wrong. For more about Kant and diabolical evil see Bernstein , 36—42; Card and , 36—61; Allison , 86—; and Timmons , — Secular analyses of the concept of evil in the narrow sense began in the twentieth century with the work of Hanna Arendt.
Instead, Arendt uses the term to denote a new form of wrongdoing which cannot be captured by other moral concepts. For Arendt, radical evil involves making human beings as human beings superfluous.
This is accomplished when human beings are made into living corpses who lack any spontaneity or freedom. Her analysis does not address the character and culpability of individuals who take part in the perpetration of evil.
In Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil , Arendt turns her attention to individual culpability for evil through her analysis of the Nazi functionary Adolf Eichmann who was tried in Jerusalem for organizing the deportation and transportation of Jews to the Nazi concentration and extermination camps.
For a discussion of the controversy see Young-Bruehl For instance, social psychologists Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo have attempted to explain how social conditions can lead ordinary people to perform evil actions.
Some theorists focus on evil character, or evil personhood, as the root concept of evil See, e. These theorists consider the concept of evil action to be a derivative concept, i.
But just as many theorists, or more, believe that the concept of evil action is the root concept of evil See, e.
These theorists consider the concept of evil personhood to be a derivative concept, i. Some theorists who believe that evil action is the root concept believe that only one or two component properties are essential for evil action, while others believe that evil action has a multitude of essential components.
This section discusses different views about the essential components of evil action Zachary Goldberg has recently argued that there is more to understanding the nature of evil actions than knowing their essential components [See Goldberg forthcoming].
This position will not be discussed in this entry. Most philosophers, and laypeople, assume that wrongfulness is an essential component of evil action See e.
It seems that, to be evil, an action must, at least, be wrong. However, this claim is not universally accepted Calder The central question for most theorists is: what more is required for evil than mere wrongdoing?
One controversial answer to this question is that nothing more is required: an evil action is just a very wrongful action Russell and This position is resisted by most evil-revivalists who claim instead that evil is qualitatively, rather than merely quantitatively, distinct from mere wrongdoing See, e.
To determine whether evil is qualitatively distinct from mere wrongdoing we must first understand what it is for two concepts to be qualitatively distinct.
According to some theorists two concepts are qualitatively distinct if, and only if, all instantiations of the first concept share a property which no instantiation of the second concept shares Steiner ; Garrard , ; Russell, Todd Calder disputes this understanding of what it is for two concepts to be qualitatively distinct, arguing instead that two concepts are qualitatively distinct provided they do not share all of their essential properties.
Thus, evil actions are qualitatively distinct from merely wrongful actions provided the essential properties of evil actions are not also the essential properties of merely wrongful actions but had to a greater degree.
Calder argues that on plausible theories of evil and wrongdoing, evil and wrongdoing do not share all of their essential properties, and thus, evil and wrongdoing are qualitatively distinct.
For instance, Calder argues that it is an essential property of evil actions that the evildoer intends that his victim suffer significant harm while it is not an essential property of wrongful actions that the wrongdoer intend to cause harm.
For instance, cheating, lying, and risky behaviour can be wrongful even if the wrongdoer does not intend to cause harm Calder Hallie Liberto and Fred Harrington go even further than Calder in arguing that two concepts can be non-quantitatively distinct even though instantiations of the two concepts share properties Liberto and Harrington According to Liberto and Harrington, two concepts are non-quantitatively distinct provided one of the concepts has a property which determines the degree to which that concept is instantiated that does not determine the degree to which the second concept is instantiated.
For instance, Liberto and Harrington suggest that both altruistic and heroic actions have the following essential properties: 1 they are performed for the sake of others, and 2 they are performed at some cost or risk to the agent.
However, the degree to which an action is altruistic is determined by the degree to which it is performed for the sake of others and not by the degree to which it is performed at some cost or risk to the agent while the degree to which an action is heroic is determined by the degree to which it is performed at some cost or risk to the agent and not by the degree to which it is performed for the sake of others.
Importantly, if Liberto and Harrington are right that two concepts can be non-quantitatively distinct by being quality of emphasis distinct, then Calder is wrong to think that two concepts can be non-quantitatively distinct only if they do not share all of their essential properties.
Liberto and Harrington argue further that evil and wrongdoing are non-quantitatively distinct in the sense of being quality of emphasis distinct.
Liberto and Harrington argue that using this theory we could say that degrees of evil are determined by degrees of harm, while degrees of wrongdoing are not.
If so, evil and wrongdoing are non-quantitatively distinct by being quality of emphasis distinct. Most theorists writing about the concept of evil believe that evil actions must cause or allow significant harm to at least one victim see, e.
However, three sorts of arguments have been used to contest this claim. First, some theorists argue that evil actions need not cause or allow significant harm because we can perform evil actions by attempting or seriously risking to cause harm, even if we fail.
For example, on this view, it would be evil to attempt to detonate a bomb in a room full of innocent people, even if the attempt is thwarted by the police See Kramer , —; Russell 52— Some people would call this act of sadistic voyeurism evil even though it causes no additional harm to the victim we can imagine that Carol is not aware that Alex takes pleasure in her suffering so that the witnessing of her suffering does not aggravate the harm.
Paul Formosa suggests that sadistic voyeurism is only evil because the voyeur allows the harm to occur and thus is partly responsible for the suffering Formosa , If so, evil actions need not cause or allow harm.
However, others dispute this contention. These cases constitute the third sort of argument against the claim that evil actions must cause or allow significant harm.
For example Eve Garrard has suggested that schoolyard bullies perform evil actions even though they do not cause very much harm Garrard , 45 , while Stephen de Wijze has argued that torturing and killing what you know to be a lifelike robot would be evil even if the robot has no conscious life De Wijze , Two sorts of responses can be given to these sorts of cases.
First, we can argue that, while the action in question is evil, it does, in fact, involve significant harm. This sort of response seems appropriate for the bullying case See Kramer , This sort of response seems appropriate for the robot case.
Furthermore, in response to all three arguments for the claim that evil actions need not cause or allow significant harm i.
For example, we can argue that failed attempts seem evil because attempting to perform an evil action is an indication that the agent performing the action has an evil character and not because the action itself is evil See Calder a, Similarly, we can argue that given their intentions, motives, and feelings, sadistic voyeurs and robot torturers are evil persons even though they do not perform evil actions for more about evil character see Section 4.
Assuming that harm is an essential component of evil, the question then becomes how much harm is required for evil?
In the Roots of Evil John Kekes argues that the harm of evil must be serious and excessive Kekes , 1—3. Claudia Card describes the harm of evil as an intolerable harm.
By an intolerable harm, Card means a harm that makes life not worth living from the point of view of the person whose life it is. Examples of intolerable harms include severe physical or mental suffering as well as the deprivation of basics such as food, clean drinking water, and social contact Card , For further discussion of the harm component see Russell , 64— Most theorists writing about evil believe that evil action requires a certain sort of motivation.
Once again, this claim is somewhat controversial. In the Atrocity Paradigm , Claudia Card makes a point of defining evil without reference to perpetrator motives.
She does this because she wants her theory to focus on alleviating the suffering of victims rather than on understanding the motives of perpetrators Card , 9.
However, while Card claims that the atrocity paradigm does not have a motivation component, part of the plausibility of her theory comes from that fact that it restricts the class of evil actions to those that follow from certain sorts of motives.
While this account of evil allows for a wide range of motivations, it does specify that evildoers must foresee the harm they produce and lack a moral justification for producing the harm.
In other words, for Card, evildoers are motivated by a desire for some object or state of affairs which does not justify the harm they foreseeably inflict.
Other philosophers have suggested that evildoers desire to cause harm, or to do wrong, for more specific reasons such as pleasure Steiner , the desire to do what is wrong Perrett , the desire to annihilate all being Eagleton , or the destruction of others for its own sake Cole When evil is restricted to actions that follow from these sorts of motivations, theorists sometimes say that their subject is pure, radical, diabolical, or monstrous evil.
This suggests that their discussion is restricted to a type, or form, of evil and not to evil per se. While some philosophers argue that certain motives, such as malevolence or malice, are necessary for evil, others focus instead on motives or desires that evildoers lack.
For instance, Adam Morton contends that evildoers are crucially uninhibited by barriers against considering harming or humiliating others that ought to be there Morton , A metaphysical silencer is a reason which is so weighty that, objectively speaking, it takes away the reason-giving force of some other consideration.
When this happens we say that the less weighty consideration has been metaphysically silenced. By contrast, a psychological silencer is a reason which is so weighty for an individual that, subjectively, it takes away the reason-giving force of some other consideration.
When this happens we say that the consideration has been psychologically silenced for the individual. If we came across a child drowning in a shallow pond, the need to rescue the child would be so morally important that it would metaphysically silence the desire to keep our clothes clean as a reason for acting or not acting.
That is, when a child is in urgent need of rescue, considerations about keeping our clothes clean lose all of their reason-giving force. They cease to be reasons for acting or not acting.
For many people, especially for virtuous people, considerations about keeping their clothes clean are also psychologically silenced by the urgent need to rescue a child drowning in a shallow pond.
In other words, virtuous people are completely unmoved by considerations about keeping their clothes clean when presented with children in urgent need of rescue.
According to Garrard, the evildoer has a particularly despicable motivational structure. She psychologically silences considerations that are so morally weighty that they metaphysically silence the very considerations which move her to act Garrard , For instance, it would be evil to psychologically silence the urgent need to rescue a drowning child as a reason for acting because we desire to keep our clothes clean.
Yet it seems that John would do evil by allowing a child to drown for those reasons. Some theorists believe that to do evil we must feel a certain way or have certain emotions at the time of acting.
For example, Laurence Thomas believes that evildoers take delight in causing harm or feel hatred toward their victims Thomas , 76— Hillel Steiner goes even further by contending that there are just two components of evil: pleasure and wrongdoing.
Critics argue that it is not necessary to take pleasure in doing wrong to perform an evil action since it is sufficient to intentionally cause significant harm for an unworthy goal such as self-interest Calder Imagine that a serial killer tortures and kills his victims but that he does not take pleasure in torturing and killing.
It seems that this serial killer is an evildoer even though he does not take pleasure in doing wrong. It is universally accepted that to perform an evil action an agent must be morally responsible for what she does.
Although hurricanes and rattle snakes can cause great harm, they cannot perform evil actions because they are not moral agents. Furthermore, moral agents only perform evil actions when they are morally responsible for what they do and their actions are morally inexcusable see e.
It is particularly controversial whether these conditions are met in three sorts of cases: 1 serious harms brought about by psychopaths; 2 serious harms brought about by individuals who have had bad upbringings; and 3 serious harms brought about through ignorance.
Psychopathy is a syndrome that consists in lacking certain emotional, interpersonal, and behavioural traits and having others Hare Some of the defining characteristics of psychopathy include shallow emotions, egocentricity, deceitfulness, impulsivity, a lack of empathy, and a lack of guilt and remorse.
For instance, a delusional schizophrenic who believes that her neighbour is a demon is not responsible for harming her neighbour since she does not understand that she is harming an innocent person; she believes she is defending herself from an inhuman malicious agent.
Motivational internalists believe that it is conceptually impossible to believe and thus to know that an action is morally wrong and yet be completely unmotivated to refrain from doing the action.
That is, for the internalist, there is a conceptual connection between believing that an action is wrong and having a con-attitude toward the action.
The internalist believes that one may be able to knowingly do what is wrong because, all things considered, she cares more about something that is incompatible with refraining from wrongdoing, provided she is at least somewhat inclined to refrain from doing what she knows to be wrong.
Since psychopaths seem to be completely indifferent to whether their actions are right or wrong, motivational internalists believe that they do not truly believe, or understand, that what they do is morally wrong.
At most, they might believe that their harmful actions break societal conventions. But it may be one thing to believe that one has broken a societal convention and quite another to believe that one has broken a moral rule.
Philosophers who reject the internalist thesis, i. According to motivational externalists, moral knowledge only requires an intellectual capacity to identify right and wrong, and not the ability to care about morality.
Since psychopaths are not intellectually deficient, motivational externalists do not think there is any reason to believe that psychopaths cannot tell the difference between right and wrong.
For more about how the internalist and externalist theses relate to the moral responsibility of psychopaths see Brink , 45—50; Duff ; Haksar ; and Milo See also Rosati It is beyond the purview of this entry to survey this literature.
The degree to which deviant behavior is caused by bad upbringings rather than genetic starting points or individual choices is a difficult empirical question.
Assuming that there is a strong causal connection between bad upbringings and deviant behaviour, there are two main arguments for the claim that we should not hold perpetrators morally responsible for behaviour that has resulted from bad upbringings.
The first argument contends that since we do not choose our upbringings we should not be held responsible for crimes which result from our upbringings See, e.
Susan Wolf offers a variant of this argument. According to Wolf people who have had particularly bad upbringings are unable to make accurate normative judgements because they have been taught the wrong values.
Wolf likens people who have been taught the wrong values to people suffering from psychosis because like psychotics they are unable to make accurate judgements about the world.
For example, Wolf has us consider the case of Jojo, the son of Jo, a ruthless dictator of a small South American country.
Jo believes that there is nothing wrong with torturing or executing innocent people. In fact, he enjoys expressing his unlimited power by ordering his guards to do just that.
Jojo is given a special education which includes spending much of his day with his father. Wolf argues that we should not hold Jojo responsible for torturing innocent people since his upbringing has made him unable to judge that these actions are wrong.
The second argument for the claim that we should not hold people morally responsible for crimes that result from bad upbringings begins with the supposition that we are morally responsible for our crimes only if we are appropriate objects of reactive attitudes, such as resentment Strawson According to this argument, perpetrators of crimes who have had particularly bad upbringings are not appropriate objects of reactive attitudes since there is no point to expressing these attitudes toward these perpetrators.
A proponent of this argument must then explain why there is no point to expressing reactive attitudes toward these perpetrators.
As a child, Harris was an affectionate good-hearted boy. Family members say that an abusive mother and harsh treatment at corrections facilities turned him into a malicious cold-blooded murderer.
Sometimes ignorance is used as an excuse for putative evildoing Jones , 69— The argument goes something like this: if an agent has no good reason to believe that she causes significant harm without moral justification, then she is not morally responsible for causing this harm because she has no good reason to act otherwise.
In this way ignorance can be a legitimate excuse for causing unjustified harm. However, since Aristotle, theorists have recognized that ignorance is only a legitimate excuse for causing unjustified harm when we are not responsible for our ignorance, i.
One sort of culpable ignorance which has received a fair bit of attention from philosophers writing about evil is ignorance that results from self-deception.
In self-deception we evade acknowledging to ourselves some truth or what we would see as the truth if our beliefs were based on an unbiased assessment of available evidence.
Some tactics used by self-deceivers to evade acknowledging some truth, including 1 avoiding thinking about the truth, 2 distracting themselves with rationalizations that are contrary to the truth, 3 systematically failing to make inquiries that would lead to evidence of the truth and 4 ignoring available evidence of the truth or distracting their attention from this evidence Jones , Several theorists writing about evil have suggested that self-deception plays a significant role in the production of evil actions and institutions Calder and ; Jones ; Thomas This entry will follow this convention.
For example, John Kekes holds an action-based regularity account Kekes , 48; , ; , 2 , while Todd Calder holds a motive-based dispositional account Calder , 22— According to regularity accounts, evil persons have evil-making properties habitually, or on a regular basis.
According to dispositional accounts, evil persons need never have evil-making properties. It is sufficient to have a disposition to have evil-making properties.
Action-based accounts contend that evil-making properties are certain sorts of actions—evil actions. Affect-based accounts contend that evil-making properties are certain sorts of feelings—evil feelings.
Motivation-based accounts contend that evil-making properties are certain sorts of motivations—evil desires. Some theorists argue for more than one sort of evil-making property.
For example, Luke Russell argues that both evil actions and evil feelings are evil making properties Russell , , while Daniel Haybron argues that evil feelings and evil motivations are evil-making properties Haybron b, Most theorists writing about evil personhood hold action-based accounts See, e.
According to action-based accounts, evil persons perform evil actions often enough, or are disposed to perform evil actions. Critics argue that the problem with action-based accounts is that it seems sufficient for evil personhood to have evil feelings or motivations, and thus, evil persons need not perform, or be disposed to perform, evil actions.
For instance, it seems that a harmless sadist who relishes in the suffering of others but who is not disposed to perform evil actions, could still be an evil person.
Similarly, a cowardly or incompetent sadist who strongly desires to cause others suffering but who is not disposed to perform evil actions, is still an evil person Calder , 23; Haybron b, According to affect-based accounts, evil people have certain sorts of feelings or emotions.
There is some initial plausibility to this view since sadism and malicious envy are paradigms of evil.
However, while it is undoubtedly true that some evil people are sadistic or maliciously envious, there is reason to believe that feelings of pleasure in pain or pain in pleasure, or any other sorts of feelings, are neither necessary nor sufficient for evil character.
The problem with thinking that certain sorts of feelings are necessary for evil character is that an evil person might routinely cause serious harm to her victims without any accompanying feelings.
For instance, someone who routinely runs down pedestrians out of indifference for their well-being, and without any accompanying feelings, seems to qualify as an evil person Calder , He should be pitied rather than condemned.
According to motivation-based accounts, to be an evil person is to be motivated in a certain sort of way. For instance, Todd Calder argues that to be an evil person it is sufficient to have a regular propensity for e-desires.
According to Calder, significant harm is desired for an unworthy goal if a state of affairs consisting of the achievement of the goal together with the harm would be less valuable than if the goal was not achieved and the harm was avoided Calder and See also Card, , 21 for a similar view.
A problem for motivation-based accounts is to explain why we should judge someone as evil based solely on her motivations. In other words, why judge someone as the morally worst sort of person for having certain desires if these desires do not result in significant harm?
Why not judge people as evil only if they actually cause significant harm? Haybron b, According to regularity accounts, evil persons have evil-making properties frequently, or on a regular basis See, e.
An advantage of regularity accounts is that they explain the intuition that evil persons deserve our strongest moral condemnation Russell , For if evil persons have evil-making properties frequently, or on a regular basis, then it makes sense to say that they are the worst sorts of people and deserve our strongest moral condemnation.
However, one problem with regularity accounts is that they do not seem to be able to make sense of the fact that some evil persons only very rarely if ever have evil-making properties.
For instance, Luke Russell argues that we should reject regularity accounts because they cannot accommodate the intuition that a brooding spree killer could be evil Russell , The brooding spree killer does not perform evil actions frequently or regularly.
She plans and fantasizes about her attack, and then performs evil actions sporadically or all at once. Thus, Russell argues, if brooding spree killers can be evil, as we think they can be, then we should reject regularity accounts.
So the question becomes, are there persons who are comparable to brooding spree killers in that they have evil feelings or desires sporadically or infrequently rather than on a regular basis?
It seems that there might be cases of this sort when opportunities for evil feelings and desires are scarce. For example, we can imagine that an evil person might fail to have evil feelings and desires because she has been stranded on a deserted island.
After many years without potential victims and needing to focus all of her attention on survival, she might lack evil feelings and desires due to a poverty of stimulus.
This would mean that she is no longer an evil person on affect and motivation based regularity accounts. However, it seems that we should say that she is still an evil person if she is still disposed to have evil feelings and desires in the sense that her evil feelings and desires would immediately return if she were presented with a victim.
If so, we should reject affect and motivation based regularity accounts. Most theorists writing about evil personhood adopt dispositional accounts See, e.
Broadly speaking, dispositional accounts contend that someone is an evil person if, and only if, she is disposed to have evil-making properties.
A potential problem for dispositional accounts is that they seem to conflict with the intuition that evil persons are rare since most of us are disposed to have evil-making properties in certain sorts of situations Russell , For example, assuming for the moment that evil actions are evil-making properties, Stanley Milgram has shown that most of us are disposed to perform evil actions specifically, administering potentially lethal electric shocks to innocent people when in certain experimental conditions i.
But if most of us are disposed to perform evil actions in these situations then it seems that on the dispositional account of evil personhood, most of us are evil, and thus, evil is not rare.
To make sense of the rarity of evil personhood, Luke Russell proposes a restricted dispositional account according to which someone is an evil person if, and only if, she is strongly disposed to perform evil actions in only autonomy-favoring conditions Russell , 72— Peter Barry argues for a similar view [See Barry , 82—90].
According to Russell, although most of us are strongly disposed to perform evil actions in Milgram scenarious, since Milgram scenarios are not autonomy-favoring conditions, most of us are not evil persons.
But if we do not have a disposition to perform evil actions on an on-going basis, then we do not really have a strong disposition to perform evil actions, or at least, one could argue, not in the sense implicitly meant by the basic dispositional account.
But we might reject this reasoning and argue instead that most of us are susceptible to becoming evil persons in these environments, and so, need to be wary of these environments.
In addition to arguing for regularity or dispositional accounts on the one hand, and action-based, affect-based, or motivation-based accounts on the other, theorists have argued for several additional theses concerning evil personhood.
According to the fixity thesis, evil persons have particularly fixed, or durable, characters such that it is very difficult to go from evil to non-evil, and changes of this sort rarely occur.
See also, Barry , 82— Todd Calder has argued against the fixity thesis. Imagine that Darlene has a highly fixed disposition to perform evil actions that she does little to resist.
Geoff also has a disposition to perform evil actions, but this disposition is not highly fixed because he is indifferent about whether he should be disposed to perform evil actions and is, in general, capricious and unprincipled.
If so, the characters of evil persons need not be highly fixed Calder b, According to the consistency thesis, evil persons have evil-making properties, or are disposed to have evil-making properties, consistently, or almost all of the time.
By this he means that evil people almost always lack empathy and concern for others, and they are in no way motivated to help others or to do what is morally right.
Some theorists contrast the consistency thesis with the extremity thesis according to which evil persons have some set of character traits to an extreme degree, e.
The extremity thesis is consistent with most theories of evil personhood. The consistency thesis is more controversial. Critics of the consistency thesis argue that it is too restrictive Calder , 22—27; Russell , Imagine that Bob loves to torture children and does so frequently, but that Bob also displays genuine compassion for the elderly, perhaps by volunteering at a long-term care facility on a regular basis.
According to the consistency thesis, Bob is not an evil person because he does not have evil-making characteristics consistently.
And yet most people would want to say that torturing children for fun on a regular basis is enough to make Bob an evil person Calder , 22— According to the mirror thesis an evil person is the mirror-image of a moral saint.
Several theorists who write about evil personhood endorse this thesis and use it to argue for their theories Barry ; ; Haybron b.
This argument makes an implicit appeal to the mirror thesis. Luke Russell rejects the mirror thesis, arguing that while moral saints are morally admirable in all respects, some paradigmatic evil persons possess some morally admirable traits, such as courage, commitment, and loyalty, which help them achieve their immoral goals Russell , — Since evil persons need not be bad in every respect and moral saints must be good in every respect, we should reject the mirror thesis.
In response, Peter Brian Barry argues that on plausible conceptions of moral sainthood, i. While most theorists writing about evil focus on evil action and evil character, there has also been some discussion of evil institutions.
For a recent contribution to this literature which makes explicit reference to evil collectives, see Scarre According to Claudia Card, an institution, in sense 2 , i.
For instance, genocide is an evil institution since significant suffering and a loss of social vitality result from its normal and correct operation without moral justification Card , — Her classification of marriage and motherhood as evil has been particularly controversial.
According to Card, marriage and motherhood are evil institutions because it is reasonably foreseeable that their normal, or correct, operation will lead to intolerable harm in the form of domestic abuse without justification or excuse Card , — Card argues that there is no moral justification for the intolerable harm that results from the institution of marriage since nothing prevents us from abolishing marriage in favour of other less dangerous institutions.
Critics argue that even if Card is correct that it is reasonably foreseeable that the institution of marriage will lead to intolerable harms, it is too heavy-handed to call marriage an evil institution.
For instance, Todd Calder has argued that an institution should be considered evil only if intolerable harm is an essential component of the institution.
Since suffering and a loss of social vitality are essential components of genocide, genocide is an evil institution.
But since spousal abuse is not an essential component of marriage, marriage is not an evil institution Calder , 27— Augustine, Saint evil: problem of Kant, Immanuel: moral philosophy Kant, Immanuel: philosophy of religion moral motivation moral responsibility moral skepticism Nietzsche, Friedrich: moral and political philosophy Plato: middle period metaphysics and epistemology Plotinus reasons for action: internal vs.
Calder SMU. This entry gives an overview of answers to these questions found in the literature. Evil-Skepticism Versus Evil-Revivalism 1. Or maybe the kid is one of those 'bad seeds' we've heard about?
A forensic psychiatrist pal of mine says, "No way. Keith Ablow has evaluated many killers and has testified as an expert witness countless times.
He reminds us that other children of this young age have inexplicably confessed to murders they did not commit and the system should proceed carefully with this child.
It seems the system is. Multiple mental evaluations have been ordered for the boy before the courts decide exactly how to proceed. If the child is guilty, Dr.
Ablow says, there could be physical reasons for what he did. Maybe he has a brain tumor or another medical problem, such as reaction to mediation or an infection of the cerebrospinal fluid that coats the brain.
But chances are, says Dr. Ablow, the trigger for the murders will be found somewhere in the boy's emotional pathology. In every case, I eventually learned the circumstances that extinguished that person's empathy.
So we are left wondering what could have happened to a boy in just 8 short years that would cause him to loose all empathy, become detached enough and desperate enough to pick up a rifle and pump ten bullets into two people.
I think it's really important we learn the why of these murders -- if only to help other hopeless children who see no other way out but violence.
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Evil Born - Inhaltsangabe & Details
Komplette Handlung und Informationen zu Evil Born Die Besten Horrorfilme. Doch seltsamer Weise Kostenlose Spiele Bei Rtl sich immer mehr die plötzlichen Todesfälle unter den Kingpin, die Kontakt mit dem Jungen hatten. Weitere Film-News. Dracula Untold. Farb-Format Farbe. Vormerken Ignorieren Zur Liste Kommentieren. David Rimawi. Filmtyp Spielfilm. Alexa Fire Tv : 0. User folgen Lies die 9 Kritiken. Ben Demaree. Jetzt 9 Songs Stream German Amazon Video und 2 weiteren Anbietern anschauen. Kommentare zu Bitburg Kino Born werden geladen Livid - Das Blut der Ballerinas. Schauspielerinnen und Schauspieler. Sterba ed. Specifically, evil means whatever harms or obstructs the causes for happiness Sprüche Hund this life, a better rebirth, liberation from samsara, and the true and Elephant Man enlightenment of a buddha samyaksambodhi. Drei.Tv is often the case, those transgressing moral boundaries stood to profit from that exercise. Kontiki Film urge you to turn off your ad blocker Kinox Kostenlos The Telegraph website so that you can continue to access our quality content in the future. Neiman, S. 12/12/ Evil Born. Bewertung: Note: • Stimmen: 28 • Platz: -. Land: USA. Genre: Horror. Regie: Jared Cohn. Darsteller: Sara Malakul Lane Jesús Guevara.
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Ist Einverstanden, dieser Gedanke fällt gerade übrigens
Nein, hingegen.